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Abstract 
Humans are primarily existential beings embedded in a particular cultural milieu of the lived-world. Every individual has 
different kinds of experiences that constructs one’s world-view about the inter-subjective world. One of the experiences that I 
have chosen to analyze is the experience of violence. I will approach the problem of violence through phenomenology. I have 
taken Michael Staudigl’s two articles, Towards a Phenomenological Theory of Violence: Reflections Following Merleau-
Ponty and Schutz and The Many Faces of Violence: A Phenomenological Inquiry, as background for my phenomenological 
understanding of violence. Violence so far has been understood by different disciplines of social sciences as an abstract 
concept where the analyst has to be an objective observer, whereas violence should be looked at as an act of intentionality by 
the perpetrator of violence. How does the experience of violence destruct the “sense structures” of the consciousness of an 
individual and bring the feeling of estrangement with the lived-world and within oneself? It will be very significant to know 
what it means to undergo the experience of violence and what contributes to the making of such an experience in order to 
have a deeper understanding of the problem of violence. The pre-established social, cultural, political, economic and legal 
structures of the lived-world form the pre-objective understanding, or the manifold horizon, of the sense structures of the 
individual. However, the above mentioned structures are also amongst the many sources that can inflict violence.  
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1. Introduction 
In this paper I have stated that the world is a lived-world that has various kinds of structures given to the 
consciousness of the individual. Phenomenology studies the structure of the consciousness, the structure of the 
lived-world, and the analysis of the conditions and the pre-conditions of its existence. It provides us with 
understanding of the way an individual makes sense of the world. I have tried to comprehend the experience of 
violence using the phenomenological method as given by Edmund Husserl. I have tried to show how the 
experience of violence takes phenomenology beyond Husserl’s understanding of phenomenology. I have also 
shown why the approach of social sciences towards the issue of violence is not appropriate due to the fact that it 
has not been able to deal with the problem of violence adequately. Lastly, I have shown how violence affects our 
intentionality and how one tries to overcome it. 
2.  Preliminary idea about violence 
We as human beings are born embedded in the social and cultural structures of the lived-world. The 
lived-world, in which one is “thrown”, is essentially an inter-subjective world. It has the historicity, tradition, 
convictions, rituals and beliefs of its own, providing a field of social reality to the individual. The realization of 
the tremendous possibilities of the being as an agency (acting being) into actuality within this socially and 
culturally given world calls for an understanding of not only the physical objective world, but also its essential 
correlates, or the essence of the world. Various disciplines of social sciences have given different theories 
regarding the different kinds of relationships human beings share with the world and with the others in the 
society (others being human beings and institutions, for example). There are several factors that act as the pre-
condition for an individual's existence in the lived-world, and one of them according to me is violence. Violence, 
as an inseparable part of human history and a continuous phenomenon of an individual's “everyday life”, has 
been an issue of concern for social scientists. Different studies made by the social sciences to address the problem 
of violence seem inadequate in their understanding and ways of engaging with it. Since the social sciences apply 
the reductionist method of finding the causes and consequences to the event of violence taking place in society, it 
demands a detached observer. However, a detached observer of a violent situation, according to me, cannot 
describe the very experience of violence that an individual undergoes.  
The problem of violence needs to be seen as a continuous phenomenon of society because of beings’ 
rootedness in the lived-world and its contingent socio-cultural practices. Violence needs to be seen as an act of 
intentionality performed to inflict pain or injury to the other in any possible manner. This affirms the presence of 
violence both in its physical and symbolic forms. The phenomenological approach to the understanding of 
violence provides a reflective description of the experiences of violence and its influence on the intentionality of 
human beings.  
3.  Husserl’s Phenomenology 
Phenomenology reflects upon the way the lived-world appears to the consciousness and the way an 
individual grasps meaning of it. According to Husserl, it is through “eidetic reduction” one arrives at the essence 
of the lived-world and the various experiences of human beings. These eidetic reductions can be reached through 
intuition, which is very different from sensory experiences. It is through the act of intentionality that 
consciousness grasps the meaning, or essence, of the world around and of the experiences one undergoes. 
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Phenomenology is the knowledge of the essences that one derives by directing one’s intentionality towards the 
object of knowledge, i.e. to be always conscious of something: it is not only to know the object as it appears to 
one’s consciousness, but rather knowing it beyond its objective reality by giving meaning to it.  
According to Husserl, every “act” is bound up with a certain “meaning”, or “noema”, by virtue of 
whether the act is directed or intentional (Smith and McIntyre, 1971, p. 541). An individual’s intentionality is 
directed not only towards the real objects or events that can be perceived and verified empirically, but also 
towards the objects which do not exist, for instance dreams, imagination, memory, hallucination, fictional 
objects, emotional states of mind etc. Such kind of intention where objects do not exist, as they exist in 
perceptual intending (where there is no doubt of their existence), also has a causal history, but is different from 
perception. Here the representational aspect of the intentional state becomes decisive, rather than the ontological 
status of the object of perception (Cunningham, 1997, p. 454). Therefore, the intention of an object does not only 
mean to describe it as it is seen but also to unfold its meaning correlates. The indeterminate and non-specific 
characteristic of the object transcends the direct givenness of the object to the consciousness of the individual.  
According to Husserl, to arrive at the knowledge of the essence of a being, by reflecting upon the 
experience of it, the positing of oneself as a physical existence is not necessary, which he called “epoche”. For 
example unicorns, although they do not exist, one can still understand what is meant by unicorns. One grasps the 
knowledge of the essences through intuition, which is different from sense perception. “Epoche” means the 
bracketing of all physical realities, which includes an individual’s physical existence also for the purpose of 
“essential intuition”. Bracketing does not mean denying the existence of the empirical world; it only means the 
suspension of empirical realities to have knowledge of the essences. Therefore, bracketing the empirical ego does 
not mean denying the physical existence of the individual, but rather to suspend it for the purpose of reaching the 
“transcendental ego”, the “pure consciousness”. Bracketing one’s empirical ego means to suspend the belief in 
one’s existence, one's past, one’s character, one’s body etc. After bracketing the empirical ego, what is left is the 
consciousness, which is engaged in performing the act of bracketing that Husserl called the “purified 
consciousness”. It will produce the knowledge of those essences which will be free from pre-given notions or 
assumptions of things and the inter-subjective world. Such a view of reality will be arrived at once one has 
undergone the exercise of “phenomenological reduction” by performing intentional acts of all sorts of epoches 
(Cooper, 1990, pp. 40-43).  
 4.  Taking a step further 
The givenness of violence to the consciousness of the individual comprises of the non-specific and 
indeterminate characteristics of the experience of violence that escapes/disturbs the habituated ways of the 
understanding of consciousness. Here, I have not taken the existence of the mind and the world independent of 
each other to reach “transcendental subjectivity”; it is rather an attempt to reflexively explore the structure of the 
experience of the lived-world (which gets subjectively constituted by the way in which an individual subjectively 
perceives the world). The consciousness that is engaged in the process of bracketing is again the consciousness of 
bracketing something. It is intentionally directed towards having the knowledge of sense structures to make sense 
of the world itself. Therefore, the epoche that demands neutralizing one’s beliefs in the empirical world is about 
the world and for the world. The understanding one develops after bracketing does not come out of vacuum. 
Rather it is built upon the already-given sense structures of the consciousness. It cannot reject the subject’s 
rootedness in the lived-world and locatedness of consciousness in the lived-body. Violence, which is given to the 
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consciousness of the individual in its both visible and invisible forms, destructs the meaning bestowal ability of 
consciousness. It develops a kind of estrangement of the being towards the world and to oneself. Therefore, while 
performing “epoche”, one is embedded in the world and cannot disassociate oneself from the pre-given sense 
structures of the lived-world. If one tries to do so then an individual’s comportment with the world and one’s 
subjective constitution within it becomes problematic. “Epoche” shows a different dimension of consciousness 
that enables an individual to perceive a thing or analyze the human experiences eidetically with a different 
perspective. Epoche is understood as an attempt of consciousness to understand the experience of violence 
eidetically and bestowing meaning to the world and to one’s own existence.   
In this paper, violence is taken as a ubiquitous phenomenon prevalent in society. It determines the sense 
structures of consciousness that bestow meaning, pre-reflectively or reflectively, to the lived-world and to one’s 
own existence. Phenomenology explores the “intentional life” of the “constituting ego”, which is constituted by 
the inter-relationship of anonymously-formed sense structures and consciously-articulated experiences. It needs 
to look at the givenness of violence not only as a limitation/violation of sense bestowal activity of intentionality, 
but also as an act of violation of one's bodily existence. The realization of the presence of violence in society 
anchors in the lived-body of the individual. 
5. Violence as an embodied phenomenon 
 An act of violence can be seen from different perspectives, performed to achieve some goals. To 
analyze eidetically, they are performed to violate the physical and symbolic integrity of the individual and 
determine the sense structure of making sense of the world. Therefore, violence should be seen as an act of 
intentionality that is inflicted with some purpose of making the other suffer (Staudigl, 2007, p. 235). 
  In order to understand how violence is present in society and influences the intentionality of the 
individual, one has to be an embodied ego. One has to believe in an embodied consciousness rooted in the lived-
world. The violence is given to the pre-reflective consciousness of the individual, while the being is pre-
reflectively engaged with one’s “everyday world”. To grasp the holistic picture of the presence of violence and 
its operativeness in the society in its different forms, while human beings are engaged with the world in their 
various habitual activities, one cannot suspend one’s belief in the empirical world and one’s own empirical 
existence in the world. An individual is born in a pre-given world that already has its existing sense structures. 
One believes in them until the time one finds some discrepancy in their existence or wants to see them with a 
different perspective. One is free to reject the already given notions or practices prevalent in the society and 
create new ones. However, the change or acceptance of a new notion is also the outcome of one’s understanding 
that one has developed while being engrained in the same socio-political and cultural practices. Therefore, an 
individual should be seen as an inseparable part of the social reality. It is only in this inter-subjective world that 
concepts like goodness, ethical values, transition and peace make sense. It is due to the “inter-subjective 
violence” that the pre-given ways of making sense of the world get destroyed.  
The phenomenological method not only provides us with a descriptive reflexive understanding of the 
empirical givens, but also with an understanding of the human being’s engagement with the lived-world as an 
“embodied consciousness”. Phenomenology lays bare the very eidetic structure of human experience by giving a 
descriptive analysis of those structures and individual experiences. It attempts to describe the experience of the 
very givenness of the objective world to the individual consciousness in terms of the way one makes sense of it. 
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It tries to thematically develop the way things are given to the consciousness and the way the consciousness tries 
to bestow meaning to it within its manifold horizon of senses. It is only through the body that one recognizes 
one’s existence in the pre-given sense structures, presented to one’s consciousness both physically and 
symbolically, defining pre-reflectively their presence in the world. It is through this process of embodiment that 
one is able to see the presence of violence in society, both in its visible and invisible forms (Staudigl, 2007, p. 
233).  
6.  Conclusion 
The fundamental phenomenological task would be to understand the effect, or the destruction, imposed 
by violence on the manifold horizon of senses that constitute the pre-reflective world view of the individual. 
Violence affects the positing consciousness of the individual, i.e. bestowal processes and one’s “being-in-the-
world”. Violence modifies and destructs the pre-objective intentional openness of consciousness toward oneself, 
the world and others. Violence destructs the sense structures of the “intentional life”, making the existence of the 
subject and one’s act of meaning bestowal in the pre-given world difficult or impossible. The constitution of the 
pre-objective world view and the formation of sense structures and bodily integrity of the selfhood is not a one-
sided process of meaning bestowal by the subject to the objective world. It is a reciprocal correlation between the 
situated being and the objective world. For the subject, the pre-given objective world is the field of perception, 
action and experience: it is the “everyday world” of human beings. It is also the source of various anonymous 
processes of “sense formation” by anonymous functioning intentionalities taking place in the “constituting ego” 
of the subject while one is engrossed in performing one’s activities for daily life (Staudigl, 2005, p. 708). It is the 
unintentional constitution of the pre-reflective understanding of the individual that provides a framework for 
constructing one’s world-view. Phenomenology explores the human being’s engagement with the lived-world in 
terms of making sense of it and dealing with it in all possible situations. 
The discourses of social sciences on violence are the “discourses of causality” (Pandian, 2008, p. 40) 
because they are concerned with knowing the causes of the event of violence, as mentioned earlier. In yet another 
discourse of social science, violence is taken as an incident that has happened or occurred, rather than as an act 
of intentionality of inflicting pain and injury to another that demands a serious analysis of the experience of 
violence and the human being’s inter-subjective relationships. Social sciences lack in providing understanding of 
violence as a phenomenon, an experience, and as an act of intentionality. One can never understand violence by 
distancing the subject from the very experience of violence. Phenomenology provides us with such an analysis of 
the very experience of violence that transcends the cycle of finding the cause and effect of violence, which 
forgets the individual’s suffering.   
An understanding of violence, as being violated due to the inter-subjective other and the symbolic other 
(symbols, institutions), cannot be fully grasped by the pre-given understanding or sense structures. It is the 
outcome of being a constitutive part of the inter-subjective relationship with the other and contingent socio-
cultural practices as a continuously evolving process of social reality. It develops a feeling of estrangement due to 
the act of the other making one alien to oneself and the world around. One tries to overcome it either by making 
the act of violence as an accepted part of one’s “body-schema”, or by revolting against it. The violated self tries 
to develop a kind of comportment with the lived-world. It tries to find oneself, intentionally or unintentionally, by 
either accepting or revolting against the act of violence. The study of the structure of consciousness, having 
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confronted or confronting violence, and the study of the structures of the lived-world that determines the world-
view of the individual needs further phenomenological analysis.  
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